The 185 MeV Racetrack Microtron under installation in the Athens Institute of Accelerating Systems and Applications has been developed in a joint NISTLANL project [3] , in order to cover the need for CW Electron Accelerators for nuclear physics.
I. THE RACE-TRACK MICROTRON FEATURES
In the RTM 5 MeV electrons from the Injector are recirculated for up to 15 passes through an 8 m long, 12 MeV, CW Linac for a total energy gain of up 180 MeV.
Microwave power is delivered from a single, 450 kW output cw Klystron (50 kW distribution system, 100 kW in the Injector Linac, 200 kW in the 12 MeV Linac.
The system uses 1.1 MW, of which 9% (100 kW) is converted into beam power [3] . With a floor area 5x16 m2 the RTM is extremely compact. The average beam power at full energy is 100 kW.
SITE PLANNING & RADIATION PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS
The Radiological Safety Aspects strongly influence the Site Planning. The major assumptions for the planning of the accelerator vault and the future extensions are following:
-The accelerator vault (9 x 36 m2, 7.5 m height) will be buried, taking into account the natural features of the ground.
-Bulky items should be brought into the vault through a concrete (cross section:4x4 m2) radiation protection door, moving on rails. Tracks are approaching through a ramp.
-The RTM will be installed in the fist part (9 x 21 m2) of the vault. An experimental hall (9 x 14 m2) will be formed through a removable (equipment radiation protection) modular concrete 1 m thick and 2.5 -3.0 m high wall, transported by a wall mounted 15 -25 tn crane.
-At the end of the vault a beam dump and activation experiment space (6 x 3 m2,3 m height) will be formed.
-The connection to the Auxilliary Building, which will include Control, Engineering, Laboratories etc., is done through a labyrinth, having a cross -section of 2 x 2 m2.
Several shapes of the maze (two, three or four legged) have been examined.
-Cables and pipelines are guided through the maze, which will also enable personnel access and equipment transportation, on behalf of a lift and a staircase.
-The lay -out of the future extension of the IASA including fence -posting, as far as location and orientation is concerned, has been influenced by the shielding needs, since soil will be the main shielding material.
MAIN ASPECTS AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS ENCOUNTERED
Concerning radiological safety, following aspects, as well as, potential hazards have been mainly encountered 0-7803-3053-6/96/$5 .OO O1996 IEEE -High-energy electron interactions with matter and estimation of the associated radiation parameters.
The beam dump will be an A1 cylinder [4] , filled with A1 spheres, fluted by cooling-water and followed by a Cu block.
-Shielding calculations, interlocks and accesibility.
-Components, air, dust and cooling water activation.
-Radiolytic reactions and noxious gases formation.
-Hazards due to potential sources beyond ionizing radiations.
The starting points and the approaching technique are presented for the most important aspects: Radioactivity may be induced in solid components of the accelerator, as well as, in air contained in the accelerator vault, experimental halls etc. and in water of the cooling systems [2] , [7] . The most important radioactivity-inducing reactions are the (y,n) and much less the (y, 2n) ones.
The components to be most suspected for activation are those that absorb most of the beam energy, in particular the beam dumps, targets, magnets and collimators.
For the nuclides relevant for the radiation protection, the corresponding saturation activities [9] ,[ 101 are between 22 (Al) and 2000 GBqkW (Stainless steel). The expected doseequivalent rates, at 1 m distance from suspicious stainless steel components will not exceed, 0.30 mSv/h, at time of accelerator tumoff.
B. Shielding calculation.
Shielding calculations have been based on the data of Alsmiller and Gabriel [1], [5] . Under the assumption of 2% lost power the first calculations result in following barriers thicknesses, taking into account possible future upgrading: The maximal total saturation activity expected in the primary cooling system, taking into acount, that the maximum be 675 GBq, including 611 GBq of 0-15, resulting in locally exposure rates of up to a few mSvlh which may easily be For the design Of the maze connecting the electron beam power will not exceed 18.5 kw, is expected to and the auxilliary building, the thermal neutron transmission curves of Maerker et al. [8] have been taken into account. shielded. The ground water level seems to be much deeper than the critical 11 -13 m from the surface. current magnet power-supplies, as well as, the ordinary electrical hazads met in an industrial environment.
Structural Element Scheduled Construction
Noxious gases produced by ionizing radiation are ozone (0-3) and nitrogen oxides (NOx). Ozone is the most toxic and might constitute a health hazard within the radiation room 1131.
The saturation concentration of ozone, in the case of no ventilation is proportional to the effective decomposition time and the ozone production rate [6] . The expected saturation activity in the Microtron vault will be approximately five times less than the threshold limit value (0.1 ppm).
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING PROGRAMME
Disturbances caused by the high frequency on the RTM signal cables and monitoring equipment (e.g. to ionization chambers, if not RF-shielded), should also be considered.
Closely related to electrical hazards, is the threat of fireand the related fire-protection system of the facility including individual smoke detectoirs combined with Halon extinguishers, upon each major functional unit or ceiling mounted.
Finally, a general accident limitation operational policy, including all the remaining miscellaneous hazards (chemicals, toxic materials as lead, LASERS, intra-laboratory traffic etc.) should be worked out, on behalf of the architectural and functional features of the facility. Following measurement programme will be set up, in order to ensure an effective environmental monitoring:
A dedicated radiation protection and environmental monitoring laboratory will be provided in the auxilliary building of the Facility.
V. GENERAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS.
Mechanical Hazards in the facility are related to the planninig, installation and operation of overhead cranes, load elevators, machine tools, gas bottles [ 111, compressed air etc. Further hazards are related with the design and the operation of the massive radiation protection doors and partitions or even with the installation of heavy items, as magnets. Last but not least, cooling water or water processing unit pipelines as well malfunction or inadequate planning in rain-water drainage, could result in flood and an appropriate detection and pumping system should be installed.
